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Abstract 
 
This paper sheds the light on the potential and constraints of possible interactions 
between Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) and the two main African Microfinance 
models namely the cooperative model, well developed in West Africa, and the commercial 
model, found in East Africa. We assess if both parties can gain from those interactions. 
We argue that given the significant funding needs of Microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 
that part of the world, in particular with regards to equity investments and capacity 
building, the African microfinance sector requires resources that can only be provided 
with the contest of private investors. In this respect, provided some conditions are met, 
for instance the presence in these vehicles of Development financial institutions (DFIs) 
that play the role of catalysts by initiating investments and taking risks that private 
investors would not dare taking; MIVs could be suitable for the financing of the rural and 
the micro-enterprises segments which are still seen as highly risky investments. Those 
segments require more volumes and longer term funding, but they have a great potential 
positive effect on Microfinance recipients and more generally on the economies they live 
in. 
In the MIVs’ perspective, due to excessive risks’ perception, the interest for the African 
microfinance still remains limited to date; however, the increasing demand for socially 
responsible investments and the needs for Microfinance investment portfolios’ 
diversification will push those vehicles to commit more and more for investments in that 
part of the world.  
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Introduction 
 
For more than three decades, modern microfinance has aimed to provide financial 
services to the low-income people excluded from the mainstream banking system and 
yet being able to carry income generating projects for some of them (Otero, 2000). While 
gaining visibility, potential recipients of microfinance services have realised that they 
could benefit from these services while traditional financial actors saw in microfinance a 
potential market to diversify their activities. As a result, the field has grown 
tremendously that it is today admitted that more than 10.000 MFIs throughout the world 
manage a total volume of micro-credits estimated at nearly 36 billion dollars (Magnoni & 
Powers, 2009) whereas the non-satisfied potential demand would exceed 200 billion 
dollars (Daley-Harris, 2009; Swanson, 2008). In this context, the question of (re) 
financing of MFIs becomes legitimate. Formerly financed by non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) themselves financed by public subsidies, today, MFIs are subject to 
a growing infatuation on behalf of microfinance investment vehicles (MIV). The question 
of the role of MIVs and their articulations with the microfinance sector has already been 
tackled, in particular in terms of impact on the governance of MFIs. Thus, Urgeghe and 
Labie (2009) give the example of the positive effect on the transparency of MFIs induced 
by the pressure exerted by those vehicles. Nonetheless, up to date, little research has 
been devoted to the financial impact (as credible and viable funding means) that could 
have these vehicles on microfinance in sub-Saharan Africa. The question of the 
intervention of these new actors in microfinance is relevant when one knows that in this 
part of the world, 80% of the adult population are unbanked, which corresponds to 
approximately 325 million people (Chala et al., 2009). In order to tackle this question in 
terms of adequacy between funding means offer, from MIVs, and funding needs, from 
MFIs, the first section proposes a definition of MIVs. In the second section, we evaluate if 
the African microfinance industry, for both the West-African co-operative model and the 
commercial model well developed in East-Africa, can profit from the contest of MIVs. In 
the third section, we also evaluate if MIVs can profit from the African Microfinance 
industry. Finally, the last section concludes.  
 
1. Microfinance investment vehicles – Overview 
 
According the Consulting Group to Assist the Poor - CGAP (CGAP, 2010), as of end 
2010, there were 122 MIVs with 8.2 billion dollars of total assets under management. 
Three-quarters of MIVs assets are represented by fixed income securities with the 
provision of debt-based products; approximately the same proportion of this debt is 
issued in hard currencies (euro, dollar). MIVs are varied. They can take the form of 
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funds, but also co-operatives, finance companies, holding companies and if we deviate 
from the consideration of the importance of their investment power often ascribable to 
the institutional investors (Urgeghe & Labie, 2009), initiatives such as Kiva can also be 
qualified as MIVs; from this point of view, we define MIVs as all public and/or private 
investment channels partly or entirely, directly or indirectly investing in microfinance 
independently of their size or status.  
 
One of the first classifications was proposed by Goodman (2004) and divided the funds 
into three categories: development, quasi-commercial and commercial funds. 
In this paper, we have used a more comprehensive classification based on Reille & 
Forster, (2008) and the CGAP (2009). 
 
Registered mutual funds 
These funds are mainly recorded in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and in Switzerland to a 
lesser extent. This category includes funds such as the Dexia Micro-Credit Fund. These 
funds invest primarily in Latin America and Eastern Europe (to 77% of their total 
investment portfolios) by senior debt (93%).  
 
Commercial fixed-income investment funds 
This category which includes funds such as the Impulse Microfinance Investment Fund, 
grants relatively big loans which reduces their overall costs and increase their returns. 
Such funds invest almost totally in areas where microfinance is most developed (Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia – to around 96% of their 
total investment portfolios). 
 
Structured vehicles  
These vehicles use securitization. According to Byström (2007), structured microfinance 
vehicles use both direct and indirect securitizations. Direct securitization carries on the 
securitization of a portfolio of micro-credits by MFIs themselves (e.g. “BRAC Micro Credit 
Securitization Series I Trust” in Bangladesh. Indirect securitization consists of the 
securitization of debts of several MFIs at the image of “BlueOrchard Microfinance 
Securities I”. The majority of the vehicles of this category consist of Collateralized Debt 
Obligations-CDO. In these operations, DFIs often subscribe to the riskiest tranche 
“equity” (but also remunerative), the other investors subscribing to the tranches 
“mezzanine” or “senior” according to their risk aversion. These vehicles generate few 
operation costs due to the fact that for they usually require passive managing strategies. 
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Blended-value funds 
These vehicles are those that require low financial returns and usually pursue clear social 
objectives. 85% of the investments come from private individuals, foundations or NGOs. 
Moreover, MIVs of this category choose to invest in small and average MFIs located in 
under-served areas like Sub-Saharan Africa (up to 26% of their total investment 
portfolios) or East Asia (17% of their total investment portfolios). Oikocredit, the Dutch 
confessional cooperative company is one of the MIVs of this category. However, being 
given the reduced size of the loans granted, these structures generate more operating 
costs.  
 
Holding companies of microfinance banks 
With this category, comes to mind the ProCredit Holding model. In addition to the 
technical assistance, the MIVs of this category receive the most significant part of 
investments from DFIs up to a total of 63% of their shares. Holdings of microfinance 
banks represent the most important investment channel in the microfinance industry in 
sub-Saharan Africa with 31% of their total investments. 
 
Private equity funds 
This category represents the most recent MIV structure. It gathers investments from 
private equity and Venture capital investments which offer equity investment possibilities 
and convertible debt to high paste growing MFIs. In fact, their equity investments 
represent up to 76% of their portfolios. This category includes both the first generation of 
venture capital funds, launched by the DFIs as well as the second generation with a more 
commercial dimension. A considerable part of the portfolios of these vehicles is also 
intended for sub-Saharan Africa for the launching of new MFIs (“Greenfield 
Microfinance”).  
 
This panorama shows a non clear segmentation with a great number of public, 
private, individual as well as institutional investors focusing on the same top tier MFIs. 
The panorama also shows that the African continent still remains a marginal investment 
area.  
 
2. Can the African Microfinance benefit from MIVs 
intervention? 
 
With more than a billion of inhabitants which is about 15% of the world’s 
population (UNFPA, 2009) but with less than 3% of the world’s wealth generated, Africa 
is the certainly poorest continent. With an adult out of five who has access to formal 
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financial services, it makes around 80 million of beneficiaries and more than 325 other 
African adults lacking these services (Chala et al, 2009). It’s agreed upon that in Sub-
Saharan Africa, today, MFIs have a great power of savings mobilisation. In fact MIX & 
CGAP (2010)2 report that African MFIs resort to international funding only to 
approximately 11% of their total liabilities; the remainder being brought by savings and 
loans from local markets, the funding needs of MFIs remain significant particularly due to 
the fact that most of the collected savings are at sight. It is even more the case for less 
performing MFIs that can not secure loans from local banks. These latter have specifically 
long term funding needs notably in terms equity investments and capacity building or 
reinforcement. In this context, analysing the role MIVs as a credible factor of growth and 
consolidation of microfinance in sub-Saharan Africa becomes a relevant question. 
 
MIVs can be considered part of the solution, the presence of various stakeholders within 
these instruments being a key success factor, DFIs in the first place. 
As a matter of fact, DFIs played a big role on the MFI level by providing starting funds 
during the launching of new institutions and by filling the gap between local funding and 
subsidies when necessary; DFIs also played the role of catalysts in the setting-up of 
MIVs. 
For funders, entering in public-private partnerships represents an effective alternative to 
direct funding of MFIs where subsidised loans provided by national banks failed because 
of non-repayments and corruption. For these organisations, the activity of microfinance is 
relatively easy to control compared to other development projects implemented. 
Moreover, the majority of the funds invested in the MFIs 3,5 even 10 years before are 
still present as opposed to what can occur in other sectors. Lastly, and it is one of the 
main reasons, these investments represent credible exit scenarios.  
These public-private partnerships are also likely to leverage private capital with less 
public resources without forgetting that they reduce overall risks (because these latter 
are shared) of funding of certain MFIs for which the country-risk would have made either 
impossible or very expensive to resort to such operations. Thus, within MIVs, without the 
contest of DFIs that act as catalysts, initiatives such as “The Currency Exchange Fund” 
(TCX)3, REGMIFA4 or “Emergency Liquidity Facility” (ELF)5 respectively, to mitigate 
                                                 
2 According to this report related to the year 2009, approximately 60% of Sub-Saharan African MFIs resources 
come from deposits- 80% of which are made of voluntary savings; 20% of loans- half of which consist of 
foreign loans; and a little more than 20% of own funds- 3% of which consist of donations and capital subsidies. 
3 This fund gathers public investors (DFIs like KfW, IFC, FMO or BIO) as well as private investors and 
guarantees to its shareholders and partners the conversion of loans they grant to MFIs made out in hard 
currencies in exotic currencies, which makes it possible for MFIs to receive funding in local currencies. This kind 
of funds is however not generalised yet. 
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exchange risk, to finance microfinance on the African continent or to mitigate  liquidity 
risk; would never have been launched without forgetting that the presence of these 
institutions within these partnerships brings insurance against mission drift risks 
(Mersland et al., Forthcoming; Hudon, 2007). 
 
The case of the West-African financial co-operative model 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the co-operative model is the dominating model in West 
Africa (Ouedraogo & Gentil, 2008). Indeed, according to figures from the World Council 
of Credit Unions (WOCCU), on a total estimated at 15,59 million members for the whole 
African financial co-operatives (FC) in 2009, the West African FCs counted more than 
12,15 million members6, that is to say at least 80% of the total number of members of 
the African FCs. 
In addition to the business model which is not made to attract external investors to the 
co-operative membership and from the limits in terms of governance in particular 
(Périlleux, 2009), one can then expect that they gather in networks to have a critical size 
which would enable them to negotiate with MIVs. For this reason, the example of 
“Confédération des Institutions Financières” (CIF) in West Africa is interesting because 
not only the confederation is a network of networks (and thus it reaches a size such as it 
could develop relations with MIVs - with conditions to define beforehand) but this one 
also has as project of launching a bank (Périlleux, 2009) whose majority shares will 
logically be intended for the member networks, but whose minority shares can be yielded 
to thirds. A case as this one is certainly likely to attract possible partners. Via the bank, 
the members of the confederation would have access to international financial markets 
and as far as the statutes of the CIF allow it, MIVs would have access to the FCs 
members, approximately 2.2 million members in this case (Boubacar & Bédécarrats, 
2009). 
Such interactions could allow a better funding of rural areas with the provision of higher 
long-termed loans, in a context where the Parmec law which regulates decentralised 
financial systems in West Africa requires FCs to have long-term resources to be able to 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 The Regional MSME Investment Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa was designed to fund Micro, Small and Medium 
enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5 “Emergency Liquidity Facility” is a fund of 10 million dollars created by multiple public and private funders 
(among others the Inter-American Development Bank, Accion International Argidius Foundation or Gray Ghost 
Microfinance Fund) for Latin America and the Caribbean to act as lender of last resort for MFIs facing natural 
disasters or crises. 
6 This figure does not include the number of co-operatives of 4 countries. These figures were drawn from the 
WOCCU Internet site consulted on February 26, 2011. 
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provide long term loans whereas members’ savings are very often at sight. Indeed, 
according to aggregate figures from the Central Bank of West African States, West 
African liabilities of FCs are represented to 75% by savings, approximately 60% of which 
are represented by short-term savings. According to Périlleux (2010), the German 
financial co-operatives of the 19th century had regional centrals which granted liquidity 
facilities and which provided monitoring services to the member co-operatives, which 
made it possible for these co-operatives to provide long-term loans to their member 
customers. We suggest that MIVs could to a certain extent and provided adaptations to 
the local context, play such roles. 
In any case, any interaction should be designed without changing the decision-making 
process to avoid the erosion of the identification feeling of the original FCs members. 
Indeed, the opening of the FCs membership to externals would result in driving the FCs 
to be more heterogeneous (Périlleux, 2009). The increase in the size which a partnership 
with MIVs could require would also generate other challenges. In fact, any partnership 
with MIVs would require important investments (Management information Systems - 
MIS…). The growth of FCs can push certain members who believe that their “voice” was 
diluted in the mass, to develop “free-rider” behaviours (Desrochers et al, 2003). There 
can also be a challenge related to the recruitment of qualified personnel in this case to 
deal with MIVs. A conflict of vision between new employees and the historical personnel 
can consequently be feared (Périlleux, 2009). Even if this conflict was overcome, the 
growth brings complexity in the interactions which require technical skills on behalf of the 
members to control the personnel’s work (Branch & Baker, 1998). The setting into 
networks which can be necessary to deal with MIVs can in addition create a gap between 
base members with those of higher levels (Périlleux, 2009) whereas a strong 
centralisation of power can feed dispossessed feelings among members (Chao-Béroff et 
al, 2000). 
 
Beyond the business model constraints, any interactions between MIVs and FCs go 
undoubtedly with heavy challenges for the latter. Indeed, they would need to grow in 
order to reach a critical size to deal with MIVs, in this respect; the setting in networks 
would be the most logical step for the co-operatives. This growth would ineluctably 
involve challenges (financial, regulatory and in terms of governance) for the FCs. 
Experiments as that of the CIF are interesting because they could be seen, provided 
adequate adaptations, as one of the future investment channels of private investors in 
the West-African co-operative model. 
 
 - 8 - 
The case of the commercial model 
 
According to the development stage of MFIs, they have specific funding needs. We 
briefly review these needs in the following paragraph based on the classification 
suggested by Van Maanen (2005). This classification will enable us to explore the 
potential interventions of MIVs in the funding of MFIs according to their stage of 
development. 
 
Category 1: It is the “start-up” category. MFIs of this category need a sponsor for 
capital7 and subsidies8. This sponsor can be a Foundation, a DFI, an NGO or any 
combination of those funders. 
Category 2: This category gathers the majority MFIs of less than three years of 
existence. The operational self-sufficiency, which is the capacity to cover operational 
costs by interest revenues, depends on the pace to which the clientele grows.  
Category 3: This category represents MFIs that reached operational self-sufficiency and 
which are headed towards financial self-sufficiency (coverage of both operational and 
financial9 costs by interest revenues). This category thus gathers MFIs which will be soon 
viable. Soon, because the financial costs (related to market funding and prudential 
provisions) will increase the total costs’ level compared to the preceding stage when MFIs 
functioned exclusively with cheaper resources from funders. 
Category 4: This category corresponds to mature MFIs that have reached financial self-
sufficiency. To reach the ultimate stage, MFIs of this category should be allowed to 
collect savings and deposits, which inappropriate and rigid regulations do not allow them 
to do in many cases. 
Category 5: This category corresponds to MFIs which are recognised as financial 
institutions by regulatory authorities and which can collect savings and deposits. 
 
This classification clearly emphasizes the funding needs of MFIs at various stages of their 
development. 
                                                 
7 Of which the MFI will lend a part. The basic function of a traditional finance company is to collect savings and 
to lend a part of it. In the case of a start-up MFI, since it is not regarded as a business firm - thus it does not 
have starting capital, and since it cannot collect savings yet at this stage- since the law does not allow it; if it 
does not receive the starting capital, it cannot simply function.  
8 MFIs need these subsidies because at the beginning the number of the clients is too restricted to apply the 
total costs to them. With these subsidies, MFIs can apply a “reasonable” private; the gap being filled by these 
contributions. 
9 Financial costs correspond to MFI funding costs and provisions for doubtful debt. 
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The first lesson of this classification is that MFIs of categories 1 and 2 require capital, to 
be able to grant loans, and subsidies which will make it possible to charge “fair” prices to 
the yet too restricted number of clients. NGOs, foundations, DFIs or any combination of 
public-private partnerships can assume such risks. The presence of a social partner, like 
an ONG, a foundation, or public, like a DFI, is indeed essential because at this stage, 
uncertainties as for the viability of the MFI are high. MIVs gathering public and private 
investors are thus indicated to finance MFIs as from their beginning. This is already the 
case and according professionals10, the trend should intensify. These vehicles, whose 
optimal relative weight between public and private actors is to be defined according to 
cases, are thus likely to be major actors of the development of microfinance in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
The second lesson is that even the first two stages passed, it is essential to continue to 
support MFIs of category 3 in our classification and help them reach financial self-
sufficiency. 
The growth requirements of MFIs of this category drive them to still need significant 
equity investments. MFIs of category 3 also still need subsidies and guarantees for MFIs 
willing to borrow from local banks (Counts, 2005). These resources can be provided by 
DFIs, NGOs, foundations or MIVs gathering for example foundations and private 
investors. More generally, if the goal is to expand the microfinance’s outreach, it is 
essential to reinforce intermediate MFIs (Creusot & Poursat, 2009). 
In addition to the fact that the presence of foreign investment vehicles can help to raise 
more funds through an increased leverage, it represents also a way of acquiring a 
banking licence more easily enabling them to collect savings and thus to better manage 
their (re) funding sources, especially for MFIs of category 4 of our classification (Van 
Maanen, 2005; Hudon, 2007).  
 
MIVs can also intervene in turmoil periods as for the recent setting-up of the 
“Microfinance Enhancement Facility” (MEF) intended to assist MFIs facing liquidity 
stresses appeared with the recent financial crisis (Magnoni & Powers, 2009).  
 
Nonetheless, the role of DFIs should be limited in time to avoid the crowding-out of 
private investors (Abrams & von Stauffenberg, 2007). At the same time, these 
institutions should also be able to intervene from time to time to support MFIs when 
necessary. Consequently, the role DFIs should be to attract private investors, to 
                                                 
10 This is extracted from a phone interview which we carried out in March 2010 with Tor Jansson who was occupying the 
function of “Microfinance Principal Investment Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa” at IFC and based in Johannesburg. 
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participate in mitigating risks that private investors would not have been ready to 
support and help avoid mission drift risks. 
 
3. Can MIVs benefit from the African Microfinance? 
 
The starting point is that around 120 MIVs invest roughly speaking in 400 to 500 
top-tier MFIs throughout the world. These funding excesses partly explain the lately 
explosion of MFIs’ repayment defaults in several countries like Nicaragua, Bosnia, 
Pakistan or Morocco (Chen, 2010). In this context, questioning whether the African 
microfinance can represent a diversification source for MIVs becomes relevant. 
 
In addition, according to MicroRate (2010), since all MIVs’ envisaged investments in 2009 
were not cashed; they accumulated significant liquidities that exceeded 1 billion dollars 
that year. These liquidities accounted for approximately 17% of the total assets, 
compared to 10% the previous year. This can even justify more attraction for the African 
Microfinance from MIVs. Indeed, this is precisely the region of the world where MIV 
investments increased the most in 2009 (45%) whereas on the global level, MIV assets 
only grew by 22% in 2009 compared to the previous year.  
 
If African microfinance could present an unbalanced risk-return profile at least for risk-
averse investors (Brière & Szafarz, 2011), investments in that part of the world, and 
more generally speaking, pursue both financial and social objectives that is referred to as 
“double bottom-line” and can be analysed with the lens of socially responsible 
investments (Urgeghe, 2010) or “impact investments” (O’Donohoe et al, 2010). Social 
Performance is even found to be profitable. In fact, recent research has showed that 
there is actually no trade-off between social and financial performance (Bédécarrats et al, 
2009; Lapenu, 2007). Indeed the findings show that the pursuit of social performance 
does not preclude financial performance. Rather, they can reinforce each other mutually 
in the long run; thanks to a deeper understanding of clients that leads to better adapted 
services, greater trust and transparency between clients and MFIs. Such benefits result in 
loyalty and improved repayment rates. 
It should however be noted that the lack of harmonisation of social performance 
measurements to date still makes it difficult for the MIVs to take them into account in 
their investment decisions (Lapenu, 2008).  
 
The need to diversify is pushing more and more MIVs to target less performing MFIs. This 
fact can benefit the African microfinance characterised by a relatively young sector. If 
less performing MFIs are targeted, we can reasonably assume that part of the financial 
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means from public funders that were up to that point intended to top MFIs would go to 
less performing MFIs. This is likely to increase equity investments and capacity building 
or reinforcement that the African microfinance needs. This fact can also help raise even 
more funds with a care put on the MFIs absorption capacity. 
 
Because of an excessive risk perception of micro-enterprises, the ratio of credit to GDP 
for the African private sector reaches only 18% on average; it reaches 30% in South Asia 
and more than 100% in high income countries (Tadesse, 2009). In fact, the African 
financial system is not well equipped to finance small companies which need greater and 
long-termed funding. Indeed, Despite their over-liquidity (Nsabimana, 2009), African 
banks still mistrust micro-enterprises and often choose to support large companies with 
short-term loans (Collier, 2009). In such a context, MIVs have the possibility to take part 
in the micro-enterprises financing. Private equity and venture capital funds can be the 
most appropriate vehicles to finance this segment. 
 
More generally, and even if the saving is sometimes more important than the loan 
provision for certain populations (Labie, 1999), in Africa, on macro level, African MFIs’ 
savings can not respond sufficiently to their funding needs. In fact, an aggregated figure 
points out a loans to savings ratio of 121, 59% (Table 1).   
 
Table 1: African Microfinance funding structure 
2007 Loan Portfolio 
(millions US$) 
Savings 
(millions de 
US$) 
Loans/Savings 
(%) 
Afrique 2 236 1 839 121,59 
Central Africa 142 232 61,21 
Eastern Africa 1 025 799 128,28 
Southern Africa  417 254 164,17 
West Africa 652 553 117,90 
Source: MIX & CGAP (2008) 
 
Situations differ between the African sub-regions. Central Africa seems to be 
characterised by an atypical profile. Indeed its loan portfolio is the weakest of Africa and 
collected savings exceed by far loans granted by MFIs of the sub-region. This can be 
explained by a late recognition of the sector by the sub-region’s banking regulator in 
2002. West Africa is the sub-region (with a more typical profile so to say) whose savings 
are relatively the highest compared to its loan portfolio. This is due to the importance of 
the co-operative model (Ouedraogo & Gentil, 2008) dominated by “net savers” (Périlleux, 
2009). East Africa, with the most important loan portfolio in absolute terms, has a ratio 
of loans on savings of 128%. This emphasizes a more developed credit culture. Lastly, 
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there is the Southern Africa sub-region, where in spite of a general weakness of the 
microfinance sector, as in central Africa, loans still exceed savings. 
The indicator used here may highlight where MIVs could intervene if we do not take into 
account other (re) funding sources other than savings.  
 
In this respect, despite the fact that the West African sub-region generates less operating 
costs due to the fact that the FC model usually goes together with member voluntary 
participation (table 2) and because of the atypical profile of central Africa, these two sub-
regions seem less interesting for MIVs. Indeed these two sub-regions seem to have a 
great savings mobilisation capacity that enables them to fund a big part of their loan 
portfolios. 
The Southern African and the East African sub-regions seem to have more funding needs. 
However, the MIVs’ interest in the Southern African sub-region would seem to be 
constrained by high operating costs (table 2). We therefore believe that a number of 
MFIs in this latter region seem to need subsidies to a big extent. On the other hand, to 
reinforce the high paste growth of MFIs of the East African sub-region, MIVs could be 
suitable, those targeting equity investments and capacity reinforcement being even more 
suitable. 
 
Table 2: Efficiency of microfinance in Africa per sub-regions 
2005 CA
11 
EA SA WA Weighted 
average 
Cost per borrower 
($) 
84 58 83 77 72 
Cost per saver ($) 29 27 56 21 29 
Source: Lafourcade et al, (2005) 
 
The arguments justifying the little interest of MIVs for the African microfinance to date 
relate to difficult environments where the majority of African MFIs operate (high risk) and 
its low profitability, which highlights an unbalanced risk-return profile. Indeed, the 
African microfinance, compared to other regions of the world, is highly characterised by 
the small size of loans granted, which partly justifies high costs and thus reduced 
profitability (table 3). 
 
                                                 
11 CA: Central Africa; EA: East Africa; SA: Southern Africa; WA: West Africa. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the African microfinance compared to other regions 
2008 SSA
12 
EAP EECA LA MENA SA All 
regions 
Outreach        
Average loan per 
borrower ($) 
626 684 4 008 1 341 746 912 1 588 
Efficiency        
Transaction costs 
(in % of loan 
portfolio) 
44 24 19 39 25 18 30 
Return        
Median ROA (%) 1,1 2,8 2,9 2,3 2,9 1,0 2,1 
Median ROE (%) 3,6 13,9 11,3 8,8 4,1 8,7 8,9 
Source: Gonzalez (2009) 
 
These features still justify today the little attraction of the African microfinance for MIVs 
especially for the commercial ones. For instance, on the 8 MIVs labelled Luxflag13 in April 
2010 and based in Luxembourg, the majority of the regulated MIVs being recorded there, 
7 invested in sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on East Africa but their investments did not 
exceed 3% of their Net Asset Value and were bound for the largest MFIs like Equity Bank 
or KWFT in Kenya or Akiba in Tanzania. West Africa, because of the preponderance of the 
co-operative model, seems to be of little interest to MIVs. Indeed, the business model 
and the property structure of West African FCs seem to raise scepticism among investors.  
 
                                                 
12 SSA : Sub-Saharan Africa ; EAP : Eastern Asia and Pacific ; EECA : Eastern Europe and Central Asia ; LA : 
Latina America ; MENA : Middle East and North Africa; and SA : South Asia.  
13 Source: Luxflag, data drawn from monthly reports consulted in April 2010. 
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Conclusion 
 
At first sight, the African microfinance seems to be a priori characterised by an 
unbalanced risk-return profile at least for risk-averse investors (Brière & Szafarz, 2011), 
which could explain the relatively little interest of MIVs in investing in that region. 
Nevertheless, recent repayment crisis caused by excessive funding in some areas of the 
world such as Latin America is pushing MIVs to diversify their portfolios, in geographical 
terms and by targeting less performing MFIs, which will likely benefit African MFIs. The 
recent infatuation for socially responsible investments can also justify MIVs’ increasing 
commitment for the African microfinance to a big extent. Attracting private investors will 
still require guarantees. Such guarantee schemes can take the form of public-private 
partnerships, within MIVs or not, where public interveners play the role of catalysts by 
initiating investments in areas where there are no or few MFIs and by mitigating the risks 
that many African MFIs still face today or by providing technical assistance that a great 
number of MFIs of Africa need to professionalise.  
 
Lately microfinance has been facing severe criticism, at the same time investments in the 
sector have never been so high. This paper represents a first step in explaining the 
current and near future drivers of microfinance investment decisions in the African 
microfinance sector. 
 
Recent research has documented microfinance as an Asset class, its main characteristics 
being that it exhibits low correlation with other asset classes while providing attractive 
returns (Krauss & Walter, 2009). Other research finds that adding microfinance funds to 
a portfolio of risky international assets does not seem beneficial, especially for the African 
Microfinance (Rients et al, 2011). In others words, microfinance would not be considered 
as an asset class. To better understand the drivers of microfinance investment decisions, 
further research is needed. 
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